Issue No. 12, July 1998 Posted 19.VII.1998
CONTENTS
So, are we at a turning point, or is this only a false dawn ? That is the question for this month's Issue.
The event that, at least chronologically, marked the beginning of this new
wave of optimism was a joint American-Japanese intervention in the forex
market on Wednesday June 17. This is convenient because it means we can
look at what is going on by starting from the three 'pointers' [LINK] that were the conclusions I drew from the
global trends assessment in the last Issue [LINK]
Skeptical Investor No. 11. June 14 1998). Because the following is
based on the same overall assessment, it may be a good idea for readers to
review the June Issue before continuing.
The anticipated international intervention in the Yen:USD exchange rate
happened very quickly - on June 17 - and must have already been planned
and agreed in principle between the USA and Japan before that weekend
(June 13/14). In a joint action starting at 0800 EDT (12.00 GMT) an
estimated US$2 bn were sold for Yen, pushing it up by nearly 5% against
the dollar within hours. This big response shows that the intervention
took a lot of currency traders completely off guard, which of course is
exactly what it was intended to do. But apparently not all:the Yen had
already climbed from its low of 146.75 (June 16) to 143.22 before 0800 EDT
June 17, so someone was already being cautious.
The reason for the surprise - and for the strong effect of the action -was
not so much that it was a joint effort, but that the USA was a participant
at all. The credibility of unilateral action by the Bank of Japan had been
damaged a couple of months earlier when it spent what is estimated to be
ten times as much - US$20 bn - in what proved to be ineffective support of
the Yen. Few currency traders believed they had much fear from further BoJ
intervention. But the participation of the USA ... this was something new,
and a shock to many. This was the first time since the"reverse Plaza
Accord" that the United States had intervened directly in the foreign
exchange markets in support of the Japanese currency unit. Further,
US Treasury Secretary Rubin has consistently, and sucessfully, followed an
unambiguous "very strong" dollar policy so an action that involved
reducing the value of the USD was at odds with all recent precedent.
Were this to represent a fundamental shift in policy, it would be the most
internationally significant such shift in a decade. But it is extremely
unlikely that it does signal any change of direction, and I do not think
many analysts would disagree. The United States embarked upon it very
reluctantly indeed, and only because things were spinning out of control
(the Yen was in danger of plummeting) and because they were backed into a
corner by the Chinese who made it very clear indeed that if something was
not done they were going to devalue their currency.
What it has done however is, for now at least, to stabilize the Yen by
putting a cap on it of perhaps 145 Yen to the dollar, or thereabouts.
Currency traders will no doubt now get very nervous if that level is
approached. And it stopped a possible slide into a new round of severe
currency chaos: thus buying some time during which, those
concerned hope, the global economy can be repaired. What it did not do
though is change anything fundamental. The underlying reasons for the
weakening Yen and the surging dollar remain as they were. The United
States still has a strong dollar policy and, at about 140, the Yen is
still internationally weak. Thus the capital flows that have distorted the
global markets may be expected to continue as before.
(It has also demonstrated that the People's Republic of China now has
enormous economic power, and prestige, throughout Asia. Expect China to
play an increasingly important role from now on.)
Then, early last week, there were two events that have been interpreted
very optimistically, boosting stock markets around the world. Ryutaro
Hashimoto, Japan's sixth Prime Minister in five years, tendered his
resignation in response to bad losses by his party (Liberal Democratic
Party) in elections to the Upper House on Sunday. And, on Tuesday, under
great pressure from the USA, the International Monetary Fund announced it
had agreed a financial assistance package with Russia which would give it
an extra $17.7 billion in IMF loans this year, plus an extra $2.5 billion
in loans from the World Bank and from Japan. With further assistance
agreed for 1999 the total package for Russia has reached $35.8 billion.
The basis for investors' delight at the resignation of Hashimoto seems to
be that they many have come to believe that he bears much of the
responsibility for the financial mess that Japan is now in: thus they see
the prospect that he may be replaced by a man who will fix it.
But such optimism is extremely premature. The problems in Japan's economy
are extensive and severe: cleaning up the estimated $600 billion (probably
much larger) of bad loans owed to Japanese banks is itself a huge and
difficult task that will take a tough and strong-willed leader, but is a
'necessary but not sufficient' requirement to get the economy growing
again. The essential fixes will involve many bankruptcies and a period of
high unemployment, and none of the candidates for the prime ministers job
is proposing to undertake all of the drastic measures that are clearly
needed. And some of the proposed measures involve Keynesian pump priming
which will do more harm than good: government debt is already $2.8
trillion - 75% of a fallingGDP. For comparison the US national
debt is 68% of its growingGDP.
I believe that even using the most optimistic scenario that can
sensibly be constructed for Japan, it would take two years before the
economy could turn around and start growing again. Obviously, during these
two years, Japan is unlikely to be able to be the engine of growth for the
rest of Asia. As for the financial aid to
Russia " ...the consensus of Western experts is that the rescue
package provides Russia with a breathing space, rather than a solution to
its chronic economic problems." (Sydney Morning Herald, July 17). I
can only agree.
I do not believe that any of these recent events has changed anything
fundamentally: the Yen intervention and the Russian "bailout" are both
best interpreted as stopgap measures that have bought some time, as has
the probably unwarranted optimism for a new man at the helm in Japan.
It is difficult to assess however how far optimism alone will drive
international markets up. I do believe though that the global economic
forces (capital flows, over investment, bad debt loads, etc.) that are at
play are so powerful that the negative fundamentals will reassert
themselves, and, in my opinion (not to be taken as a recommendation)
buying back into the Asian markets at this stage would be best
contemplated as merely a short-term speculative play. I do not see,yet, a
turning point.
The Canadian unit is vulnerable because of the nation's economic policies
exacerbated by falling commodity prices due to the Asian
recession(commodity exports are important to Canada). The slide against
the US currency paused at the end of last week on the renewed optimism in
Asia, and because the US dollar itself weakened somewhat, but many
analysts have been saying they expect it to continue.
POINTER: The danger is worse than that: the Canadian dollar may now be
vulnerable to a massive short-selling attack by the hedge funds.
Further, those Canadian politicians who have been telling the populace
that the decline in the value of the currency hardly matters to them
except when they go on vacation to the United States or Europe are either
lying, incompetent or plain stupid.
In line with all that I have said above, I do not see either as being
evidence of a change in the trends, but merely temporary adjustments
directly related to the increased (but, in my view largely unwarranted)
optimism elsewhere. Bond yields are being driven down because now almost
everyone - optimists and pessimists alike - sees deflation, or at least
continuing disinflation, ahead. The New Era optimists expect continuing
healthy disinflation, whilst those who (including myself) interpret the US
stock market as a bubble that is going to burst see the possibility of a
deflationary recession. There is also no evidence of any change in the US
"very strong" dollar policy, and little that I can see that leads me to
expect any substantive reversal of the flow of international capital into
US dollar assets for the time being.
However, growth in the US money supply has not as I had hoped slowed, so
this raises doubts over the medium-term outlook. Due to the need to cover
the dramatic events of the last month in this Issue I have deferred my
plan to review the US markets until the next Issue.
For now though, I will leave you with this. The United States has a GDP
of$8 trillion. The total capitalisation of its stock markets is now
$11trillion. An overall 50% decline in share prices at this stage would be
a loss of perceived wealth equal to almost 69% of annual GDP.
Canucks' Corner
The Canadian dollar has continued to slide against the US dollar and is
now at a 140-year (sic) low. Both the Finance Minister and the Prime
Minister have made public statements to the effect that it doesn't matter
very much, and intervention by the Bank of Canada has been restricted to
smoothing the decline rather than preventing it. Canada for several years
has been following a "low dollar" policy,whilst the USA is following a
"very strong" dollar policy.The United States
T-bill yields have firmed a little (the long bond is back above 5.7%) and
there was some weakening of the US dollar against other currencies last
week.