Issue No. 2. Mid-July 1997
Posted 22.VIII.1999
Nothing has happened in the past month to change the
argument I put forward in the first Issue of The Skeptical Investor. This
can be briefly summarised as two points. First, in conformity with what
most investors now believe, the USA is indeed experiencing strong economic
growth without any resurgence of inflation. But, secondly, stock markets
there have nevertheless become severely overvalued and consequently a
tumble is now a certainty.
Reiterating these two points is important because, if they are right, then
those analysts who are attempting to predict the end of the current bull
run in US stock markets by looking for a resurgence of inflation or other
signs of looming domestic economic problems are probably barking up the
wrong tree. It is likely to be a stock market crash that puts an end to
our present apparently idyllic economic picture, not the reverse.
Accordingly, it is to the stock markets themselves that we must turn for
clues about what might happen (whilst of course maintaining a wary weather
eye on the economy in case an unexpected storm brews up) and that is what
I shall attempt to do in this Issue, as well as report on the, not
unrelated, situation in the Asian Pacific Rim.
So, if we accept this contention that the stock market has ceased to
represent and is ignoring economic reality, then common sense tells us
that economic facts and analysis can not now give us very much in the way
of information about how stocks are going to perform. The market now
"stands alone", having become a self-referenced system, feeding on itself,
and its performance to date--not external factors--is at present the best
(indeed the only) predictor of future performance. That is why the
increase in prices in these situations tends to become exponential: it is
just mathematics, not economics. The more prices go up, the more money
will be drawn in, and the more prices rise. (As an aside, it may be worth
mentioning here that this is the reason for the oft observed fact that in
bull markets, bad news is ignored--the process is not really being driven
by economic news, except that good news reinforces the real
underlying driving forces.)
And, because of this, there is no telling how far the market will rise
or how long this bull will continue. There is an ultimate
mathematical limit to it, the drying up of available new demand, but the
pool that can be drawn upon (cash assets within the USA, such as bonds,
and the ongoing flow of overseas funds into the American economy) is so
huge that that the limit is a long way off indeed. Dow 12,000+ would
likely be easily reached if the pool of new demand were the only limiting
factor, and it is indeed considerations as this which are leading some
analysts to predict that most stocks will continue to soar. And they may.
But a sell-off may happen at any time. I will look at this below, but
first want to consider what this analysis, if correct, means for equity
investors.
Point 1: For most stock market investors, it is already too
late.
Point 2: Buying now for the long-term is foolish.
Point 3: There are still opportunities for the skilled short-term and
medium-term investor.
Point 4: Forget about sector rotating.
This bull market now has little to do with the economic cycle. Business
sectors in and out of favour are today a result of investors chasing
momentum. And a market crash is going to take all sectors with it
(precious metals mining stocks may just possibly be an exception).
Point 5: Be especially wary of Mutual Funds.
Mutual Funds can perform very badly indeed in a severe market downturn.
Fund managers are forced to sell stocks which they would prefer to keep,in
order to meet cash redemptions. Many mutual fund investors are
inexperienced and make inappropriate decisions. And, I'm afraid, many of
the managers of these funds are themselves inexperienced kids who have
been successful only because they happened to get into the business at an
opportune time and have ridden the bull market on its way up. I certainly
do not trust any of my money to a 30-year-old. Especially one who has
never experienced a bear market, never mind an honest-to-goodness market
crash.
That is, there will be a failure of market sentiment. There are a myriad
of possible things that could trigger this. It may be something big and
obvious--a war that breaks out in the mid-east, a major financial or
political scandal that erupts in America, a revelation that the Japanese
have started selling off part of their huge holdings of US Treasury Bills.
But more likely it will be something that on the surface looks trivial, or
even no single trigger may be apparent: it may be simply an accumulation
of tiny doubts adding up to a sudden panic. There is an analogy in the way
a defeated army sometimes collapses, seemingly all at once, without any
single event: military men will understand such a collapse of morale.
And, there will almost certainly be no warning. The technical analysts
will probably not see it on their charts before it is upon them. If the
trigger this time is some external event, then some fundamental analyst
may have seen this event coming but there are so many scenarios out there,
who knows which if any will be right until after it happens? And if it is
just a failure of sentiment, then seeking a prime cause, even post hoc,
will be a futile exercise.
In the summer of 1929, a market correction was widely anticipated in the
US, but it was almost universally believed that, because the economy was
fundamentally healthy, it would be weathered and investors who held on and
did not sell would be safe. Commentaries today are eerily reminiscent with
more and more of the "talking heads" blithely predicting a 10% or 20%
"healthy correction" possibly like that of 1987: a tacit admission by the
way that the prices of stocks are too high. They were not so absurdly
overvalued in 1987.
Using historical norms in terms of price/earnings ratios and yields, fair
value would put the Dow Jones Industrial Average at perhaps 4,000-5,000.
Thus, in the absence of massive intervention by the US authorities,
historical precedent suggests an initial rapid fall of say 20% followed by
a protracted bear market taking average valuations down to about 50% of
their current levels. By that time negative momentum, investor fear, and
the severe negative effects of such a massive disappearance of wealth from
the economy will take prices much lower: I think that 2500 on the Dow is
ultimately possible. Some analysts are predicting worse. But , from the
point of view of an investor planning strategy now, the actual level to
which the markets fall in a major crash doesn't matter very much: whether
I anticipate 50% or 90% does not affect what I am doing today with my
funds.
In order to make preparations for coping financially, it is not necessary
to try to anticipate when there will be a market collapse, nor how far
down the prices of stocks will go, but what is likely to happen
financially and economically in the aftermath. And the key to this will be
what governments and monetary authorities do. In 1987, the US Federal
authorities were able to prevent the problem in the market from worsening
and perhaps spreading into the whole economy by, in the jargon, "injecting
liquidity" into a market which was in danger of simply seizing up. There
are also persistent rumours that there was more direct intervention
through, perhaps, large scale purchases of options. It is obvious that
they will attempt to do the same this time, and presumably there is a very
detailed contingency plan drawn up. However, they may fail because the
sheer size of the problem is now so much bigger than it was then, and in
that eventuality all efforts will be directed towards heading off the
possibility of a severe, probably world-wide, recession. In Issue Number
3, I will explore the possible course of events in more detail.
Japan, already suffering from a
protracted economic downturn, is now facing more problems. It has a huge exposure to Thai foreign debt; in fact it has more
investment committed to Thailand than to any other foreign country. And
Thailand may have trouble repaying its debt.
It is estimated that (because much of it is denominated in yen, US dollars
and other foreign currencies) the recent de facto devaluation of the Thai
baht has increased Thailand's total foreign debt by 9% to 17%. Eighty
percent is owed by the private sector, so some significant proportion of
this is likely to be repudiated through corporate failures. The fact that
Thailand has been in communication with the International Monetary Fund,
Japan, Taiwan, even the People's Republic of China, for help, indicates
the scale of the problem.
As for the domestic effects in Thailand itself, the country is facing a
severe, and probably protracted, slump. The currency devaluation itself is
inflationary (because imported goods and raw materials now cost more), but
I believe that a nasty deflationary recession is more likely to develop.
Repudiation of debt--one of the immediate causes of deflation--appears to
be spreading. Even Bernard Trink in his nightlife column in the Bangkok
Post has been commenting on the number of people walking away from
condominium mortgages, and cars being repossessed. When I was in Bangkok
myself for a conference late last year, I was shown a brand new hotel
which (just before Christmas, at the height of the tourist season) only
had ten percent room occupancy: the property boom of recent years is going
to end with many business failures. Several finance companies and banks
are facing difficulties due to bad loans, mainly on unsalable offices,
hotels and condominiums. The government has been attempting to alleviate
this problem with low interest loans, forced mergers with healthy
companies, and so on. They have even forced some, including one of the
largest, Finance 1 PLC, to suspend operations in June for a month, hoping
to find ways to solve the crisis. (What will happen to the bonds issued by
Finance 1?). But I expect that it will get away from them, and, unless
there is a massive international bail-out, the country will slide into an
economic depression. Another Asian Tiger, South Korea, is
facing similar problems. Stock markets have declined to long-term lows,
and the currency is under pressure. Bad debts are described as
"snowballing": trading in corporate bonds has virtually ceased. This week,
the country's 8th-largest conglomerate, Kia Group, became insolvent, and
there are rumours that as many as ten other financial conglomerates may be
near bankruptcy. The Bank of Korea is said to be "injecting liquidity" to
stave off further financial failures, and other measures are being taken.
(I have no faith in the ability of such government measures to do more
than provide temporary relief: the debts are real and always show up
somewhere else in the economy.) In Singapore too, stock
markets have been falling--the Straits Times Index is off 23% from the
high reached on February 26th, 1996--and the currency is weak. Malaysia
and the Philippines are also experiencing troubles.
What is causing these problems? These are all countries that have
apparently been doing very well economically: even the laggard Philippines
has bee playing catch up with its regional neighbours. There is no
international economic slump to destroy their export markets, no major
war, no big natural disaster. Well, there are both economic and financial
factors involved, and both are at least partly caused by the growing asset
bubble in America. All the countries, other than Japan,
referred to above have two things in common other than being in South East
Asia. They have, or until recently had, currencies linked to the US
dollar, and they are very dependent upon exports. Consequently, as the
black hole of US financial asset markets has drawn in money from
everywhere, driving up the dollar, the strengthening of these countries'
dollar-linked currencies has reduced their export competitiveness (without
being matched as in the US by massive capital inflows). This is the
economic effect.
Probably more damaging though are the financial effects. These
fast-growing economies need huge amounts of foreign capital to finance
that growth. Some of this is money earned from exports, but much of it
comes from foreign investment, and it does not take an actual reversal of
these capital flows into the economy--a slowing will do--for the whole
financial structure to start falling apart. It becomes apparent that much
of the economy is little better than a Ponzi scheme--perhaps that is a
little harsh, but growth is certainly dependent upon ever increasing
inflows of credit to keep it going. Without this it goes into reverse.
Quite simply put, the US financial markets are sucking in much of the
available capital now, resulting in liquidity crises in these countries.
This by the way is not just money that is going into American stocks; it
is money being drawn into all US dollar denominated assets.
Putting this into the form of a concrete example. One can stand on one of
the footbridges over the Sukhumvit Road in Bangkok and watch the day-long
traffic jam beneath. There will be many shiny new Toyotas for instance.
Purchased with a baht loan. The baht profit becomes yen in Tokyo. And is
invested, or frees up money to invest, in US dollar assets in America.
Feeding the asset bubble there, and drawing money out of the Thai economy
and the Japanese economy. A rather simplistic example for sure, but that
is the sort of route that capital is now following. Copyright© 1997 Max
Moseley and The Skeptical Investor, All
Rights Reserved.The US stock market bull continues.
The price you will have to pay to purchase an average Dow Jones or S and P
stock has been too high for a long time now. This is based upon perfectly
easy to use valuation methods--there is nothing very sophisticated or
difficult about them. The trick to successful value investing is finding
companies whose stock is undervalued by the market. Forget the
"new era" thinking that says that because these valuation methods indicate
that almost all stocks are nowovervalued by the market, but are
still rising in price, the methods themselves must have ceased to be
valid. This is at best nothing but psychological rationalisation, at worst
a lie by cunning brokers talking up prices.
If a lot of investors attempt to sell, the market crashes. That is all
there is too it now. Some number of investors can take the courageous
decision to sell out now, risking forgoing further profit, but holding
their gains. Others might protect themselves by the use of
derivatives,perhaps placing a down bet on a market index such as the S and
P. The rest are in big trouble.
Given the risk of a crash, buy-and-hold is now the worst strategy an
investor can follow. He is knowingly purchasing assets at very inflated
prices. He is not only hoping that they will become even more inflated,
but that they will stay that way.
I have heard people say that a market like this one must eventually
collapse "under its own weight", but this is merely rhetoric. It is not a
meaningful statement, and has the unfortunate consequence of leaving an
impression that the higher the market goes, the more probable it is to
collapse in the near future. This is probably not true. Think of it like
tossing a coin and getting seven heads in a row. Intuitively it is easy to
feel that the likelihood of getting another head on the eighth toss is
very low, but of course it is still exactly 50%. I consider that the
probability of a crash in 1997 is no greater than it was in 1996. And, if
we survive 1997, it will be no greater in 1998. But this does not mean go
for a buy-and-hold strategy: that is rather like doubling up your bet on
every toss --you must lose eventually. It does however imply that,
provided you understand the risks involved, have a strategy appropriate to
the times and a firm exit strategy, there may still be no more risk
involved in short- and medium-term investing than there ever is. How does
the probability that the market will rise as oppose to fall over the next
month (two months, three months, ... ) look? It is more likely to go up
than fall, but it is the size of the downside risk that is the
problem; in my opinion this outweighs the probable gains of a medium-term
investment in, say, no-load equity mutual funds. But, for those with the
market savvy, there are strategies that can be used to make money if the
market continues up, whilst limiting the downside risk. Going long through
the purchase of call options (whilst keeping ones capital safe, and
liquid) may be one of the best strategies, but it is only for those who
understand options trading. Overall though, those in the best position to
make money in this market probably are the short-term traders.What will end the bull?
The bull market will end when a sufficient number of investors realise the
danger they are facing and sell out or short the market.How will it end?
In the 1987 US crash, the market fell about 20%, then recovered within a
few months. During the first months of 1990, the Japanese stock market, as
measured by the Nikkei-Dow Index, fell more than 60% from its peak of
39,000.Today, almost seven years after, it stands at approximately 20,000.
The Stock Exchange of Thailand Index topped out at 1754 on 4th January
1994, and has been steadily falling in a protracted grinding bear ever
since. On 19th June this year it was 465, and has now recovered a little
to 600 or so, but largely as a result of a recent de facto 20% currency
devaluation. In the greatest stock market failure of modern times Wall
Street, which began its slide in October 1929, had lost 90% of its value
by the time the bottom was reached in 1932. Taking into account currency
depreciation, the market did not fully recover until the late 1950s. And,
in reality, it never really recovered because many of the companies
represented on the market indices in 1929 failed and went into
liquidation.
Asia Watch
Meanwhile, apparently ignored by those North American investors blithely
pouring money into stocks, the economies of much of the Asia Pacific Rim
are unravelling.